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LOBBYING LAWS IN ILLINOIS:
AN INCOMPLETE REFORM
Lee Norrgard *
Although lobbying is deemed a protected right in our society,
Mr. Norrgard contends that the Illinois statutes which govern the
profession have failed to reveal adequately the undue influences
exercised over state officials by various interest groups. In this Ar-
ticle, he analyzes the deficiencies in the present regulatory scheme
and suggests stricter regulations requiring the disclosure of fi-
nances, personnel and activities in order to help rid the state of
unethical lobbying practices.
"A landed interest, a manufacturing interest with many lesser in-
terests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations. . . . [T] he regula-
tion of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task
of modem legislation and involves the spirit of party and faction in
the necessary and ordinary operations of government." I When
James Madison wrote that statement, he was arguing that the federal
structure of government is the best check on conflicting interests.
Subsequent to the enactment of the federal Constitution, there de-
veloped a mechanism supplementary to the legislative process, 2
sometimes described as the "third house." This "third house" consists
of representatives of interests who, by various means, seek to influ-
ence the public policy. These people commonly are known as lob-
byists.
Although the impact of state public policy decisions on the indi-
vidual may not be as far-reaching as those of the federal government,
state decisions clearly are important to the over 400 interest groups
represented in the Illinois legislative process. The state collects, ap-
propriates, and spends enormous amounts of money. The economic
impact of the spending of these monies is immense. One state rep-
resentative has noted that "many of these special interest groups are
* Executive Director, Common Cause-Illinois. B.A., St. Olaf College. The author wishes
to express his appreciation for the assistance given by Ms. Ellen Block and Mr. Kenneth Guido
of the legal department of Common Cause and to the staff of the Better Government Associa-
tion. The author further emphasizes that the views expressed in this Article are his personal
opinions and do not represent the views of Common Cause nationally.
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison) 54 (1904).
2. See Note, The Poor and the Political Process: Equal Access to Lobbying, 6 HARv. J.
LEGIS. 369 (1969).
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groups that do have a legitimate problem and legitimate concern, and
they are all competing for the tax dollar-nine billion of them. ' 3
The state budget for fiscal year 1978 is $10.3 billion.4
All of the fifty state governments 5 and the federal government 6
have decided that the checks and balances prescribed by the framers
of the Constitution were insufficient in regulating the various in-
terests. Consequently, legislation has been enacted establishing a sys-
tem of lobbyist regulations. Some of these laws merely require the
registration of lobbyists on a public docket. 7 Others call for registra-
tion of lobbyists and lobbies as well as periodic disclosures of all funds
expended in seeking to influence legislation, rate-making and rule-
making. 8
In the last twenty years, Illinois has enacted two statutes regulating
lobbyists. The first, approved in 1957,9 only required the registration
of lobbyists in a "Docket of Legislative Agents" with the Secretary of
State. 10 The second," approved in 1969, continued the registration
process for all persons seeking to promote or oppose legislation, '2 and
added the requirement of periodic disclosures of certain expendi-
tures.' 3 Many observers have criticized the 1969 Act as in-
adequate,14 and legislation was introduced 15 to amend it significantly
during the last session of the 80th General Assembly.
The purpose of this Article is to examine lobby registration and
disclosure in Illinois. It will define and analyze lobbying in Illinois,
review the history of lobby regulation laws in the various states and
3. See THE ILLINOIS GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN PROFILE, Project Poll 159, 161 (1975) (inter-
view with State Representative Harry Yourell). On file with the author, COMMON CAUSE-IL-
LINOIS.
4. See generally Bureau of the Budget, Illinois State Budget for Fiscal Year 1978 (1978).
5. See COMMON CAUSE, Lobbying Law Reform, (December, 1976). All states require at
least the registration of lobbyists. Forty-three states and the federal government require some
form of registration and disclosure.
6. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 261-270 (1970).
7. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 63, §§ 110-113 (1959).
8. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE 9 42.17.020-.030 (Supp. 1977).
9. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 63, 9 110-113 (1959).10. Id. § Ill.
11. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 63, § 171-182 (1971).
12. Id. §173.
13. Id. §176.
14. See Statement by State Representative Michael S. Holewinski (April 24, 1977): "the law
that is supposed, to regulate lobbying activities is, in reality, nothing more than a series of
loopholes and exceptions." Transcript of news conference on file with the author, COMMON
CAUSE-ILLINOIS.
15. See, e.g., S.B. 864, 80th Gen. Assembly (1977 Sess.); H.B. 1871, 80th Gen. Assembly
(1977 Sess.); H.B. 1820, 80th Gen. Assembly (1977 Sess.); H.B. 3313, 3314, 3315, 3329, 80th
Gen. Assembly (1978 Sess.).
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in Illinois, and examine the arguments for and against lobby disclo-
sure. Further, it will review the 1969 Act and the proposed reforms,
and study the constitutional issues raised by lobby regulation.
LOBBYING IN ILLINOIS: AN OVERVIEW
Lobbying exists in every democracy where people seek to influence
government.16 A generic definition of this activity is, "asserted, ar-
ticulated, felt needs interjected into the governmental decision-
making process." 17 Lobbying is, in fact, "ubiquitous," 18 and essen-
tial to an understanding of the adoption and implementation of public
policy. 19
Both the United States and the Illinois Constitutions protect lobby-
ing because of its importance to our governmental structure. The fed-
eral Constitution states that "Congress shall make no law . . . respect-
ing . . . the right of the people to petition the government for a red-
ress of grievances." 20 The Illinois Constitution of 1970 provides that
"[t]he people have the right . . . to make known their opinions to
their representatives and to apply for redress of grievances."21
Although lobbying is one of the most important constitutional rights
of a free people, it has had a seamy side. It can consist of "[p]owerful
interest groups desiring to obtain or avoid legislation ... pouring
vast sums into aggressive propaganda campaigns that at best present
only one side of a case, and at worst involve outright prevarica-
tion.... "22 Lobbying also can consist of the buying and selling of
votes. 23
Clearly our institutions of government can be threatened by this
protected right of petition. Congress has the power "[t]o preserve the
departments and institutions of the general government from impair-
ment or destruction, whether threatened by force or corruption." 24
However, any attempt to deter actual corruption or avoid the appear-
16. See E. LANE, LOBBYING AND THE LAW (1964) [hereinafter cited as LOBBYING AND THE
LAw].
17. Smith, Regulation of National State Legislative Lobbying, 43 U. DET. L.J. 663, 664
(1966).
18. Id. at 667.
19. See LOBBYING AND THE LAW, supra note 16, at 3.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
21. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 5 (1970).
22. Cooper, The Tax Treatment of Business Grassroots Lobbying, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 801
(1968).
23. See Shaffer, Ready-Mix Trial: Tale of Intrigue, Bribery, Chi. Daily News, May 28, 1976
at 10, col. 2. See also United States v. Craig, 528 F.2d 773 (7th Cir. 1976) cert. denied, 425
U.S. 973 (1977).
24. Burroughs & Cannon v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545 (1934).
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ance of corruption must be very carefully drawn, "because First
Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive." 25  Regula-
tion also must be limited to the means of lobbying and not the
ends,2 6 and cannot restrict all efforts to influence public opinion. A
definition of prohibited lobbying must include the pressures directed
towards a policy maker concerning a specific proposal. 27
Despite its title, the Illinois Lobbyist Registration Act of 1969 does
not specifically define lobbying. 28  It does, however, require registra-
tion with the Secretary of State of "I[a]ny person who, for compensa-
tion, or on behalf of any person other than himself" 29 and "any per-
son any part of whose duties as an employee of another person" 30
who "undertakes to promote or oppose the passage of any legislation
by the General Assembly . . . or the approval or veto thereof by the
Governor.... "31
Registered lobbyists 32 may represent one 33 or many interests;
some represent as many as seven different interests. Several ex-
25. N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
26. See Eastern R.R. Pres. Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 139 (1961). In
Noerr it was stated that "[t] he right of the people to inform their representatives in govern-
ment of their desires cannot be made to depend on their intent in doing so. It is neither
unusual nor illegal for people to seek action on laws in the hope that they might bring about an
advantage to themselves and a disadvantage to their competitors." Id.
27. United States v. Harris, 347 U.S. 612 (1954). In their decision upholding the constitu-
tionality of the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, the Supreme Court construed the language
of this Act, defining lobbying to mean "lobbying in its commonly accepted sense-to direct
communications with members of Congress on pending or proposed federal legislation. At the
very least, Congress sought disclosures of such direct pressures exerted by the lobbyists them-
selves or through their hirelings or through an artificially stimulated letter campaign." Id. at
620. A constitutional definition, unlike a generic one, must limit itself to the means of lobbying.
Further, this lobbying must be directed at the policy maker concerning a specific proposal.
28. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 63, § 170 (1975).
29. Id. § 173(a).
30. Id. § 173().
31. Id. § 173(a), (b).
32. Over the years, the Index Division of the Office of the Secretary of State has compiled
the COMPLETE LIST OF REGISTERED LOBBYISTS (hereinafter cited as the LOBBYIST LIST). See
76th Gen. Assembly, 2d Sess. (1970); 77th Gen. Assembly (Nov. 17, 1972); 78th Gen. Assembly,
1st Sess. (Dec. 31, 1973); 78th Gen. Assembly, 2d Sess. (Dec. 19, 1974); 79th Gen. Assembly,
1st Sess. (Dec. 5, 1975); 79th Gen. Assembly, 2d Sess. (Dec. 31, 1976); 80th Gen. Assembly,
1st Sess. (Oct. 17, 1977).
Year 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
# of 117 365 251 352 288 379 324
registered
lobbyists
Generally, there are fewer registered lobbyists in the even numbered years because those
sessions are limited to legislation concerning appropriations and revenue.
The figures should be considered as yardstick measurements, not as exact figures, for two
reasons. First, the figures quoted are taken from the final list of registered lobbyists published
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legislators work as lobbyists, and even a former governor has served
in this capacity. Most work fulltime in Springfield while the legisla-
ture is in session, but some persons, as volunteer lobbyists, devote
.only what time they can spare from their normal activities.
According to a recent study, most lobbyists are middle-aged, white,
Protestant, male and professional-holding a law degree or some
other graduate degree.34 Almost seventy per cent see themselves as
carrying out the instructions of the interest they represent. They are
"hired to provide tactical skills within the legislative arena," not to
develop policy. 35 There are slightly more Republican lobbyists, with
the Republicans generally representing business and industry, trade
associations and farm organizations. Democrats generally represent
labor, occupational associations, civic organizations and veterans' or-
ganizations. 36
Since the Act became effective in 1970, the number of registered
lobbyists has risen consistently. As of October, 1977, there were 424
lobbyists, representing at least 400 different interests. 37  The in-
terests represented were as follows: 38
Approximate Number of







Manufacturing and Retail 60
Miscellaneous 50
Medical and Health 10
Occupational Associations 40




for that year-generally in December-and may not include individuals who have registered
and subsequently resigned prior to compilation of the list quoted here. Second, no agency is
responsible for insuring that all those engaged in lobbying activities who probably should be
registered are actually registered.
33. Two-thirds of the lobbyists represent only one interest. R. Maple, Role Orientation of
Registered Lobbyists 42 (1974) (unpublished master's degree thesis in Illinois State University
Library).
34. Id. at 103.
35. Id. at 102.
36. Id. at 70, 104.
37. See LOBBY LIST, supra note 32, 80th Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (Oct. 17, 1977).
38. See LOBBY LIST, supra note 32, 1970-1971. In 1971, there were 365 lobbyists and
1978]
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There are also many lobbies seeking to influence executive branch
agency policy in the rate-making and rule-making areas. In some in-
stances these interests utilize the same individuals. 39  Since the Il-
linois Act does not require the registration or disclosure of lobbyists
seeking to influence executive branch agencies, little public informa-
tion is available for study or comparison.
Obviously not all of the registered lobbyists or the interests they
represent are equally effective in influencing public policy. 40 Accord-
ing to one observer, the key ingredients for effectiveness are: the
ability to sustain an attack over long periods of time, active members,
money, time, skills, patience, and dedication. 41 The forms that these
ingredients generally take can be described as direct and indirect (or
grass roots) lobbying. 42
Direct lobbying is that which occurs directly between a lobbyist
and a public official. One man, who in the last session represented
the Urban Counties Council of Illinois, the Illinois Canner's Associa-
tion, R.R. Donnelly & Sons Company and Mobil Oil Corporation,
described his direct lobbying activities for one day as: screening bill
introductions, screening committee postings, conferring with clients,
appearing at legislative committee hearings, meeting with state agen-
cies, possibly meeting with the Governor's office, contacting indi-
vidual legislators, and having dinner with individual legislators. 43
One legislator responded to the question of how lobbyists work, say-
ing, "Every group imaginable from farmers to medical societies to
dental societies to business groups were having receptions with
cocktails and perhaps dinner." 44 Unfortunately, direct lobbying has
approximately 380 interests represented, while in 1977 there were 439 lobbyists and approxi-
mately 400 interests.
39. Press release of the Association for Modern Banking in Illinois (November 18, 1977). On
file with the author, COMMON CAUSE-ILLINOIS. The release, entitled Olson Named Associa-
tion for Modern Banking in Illinois Director of Government Relations, disclosed that "Olson's
new responsibilities will include promoting good relations between AMBI and the General As-
sembly, the Executive Branch, and the various regulatory agencies."
40. Haley & Kiss, Large Stakes in Statehouse Lobbying, 52 HARV. Bus. REV. 125, 128
(1974). The authors stated that "the fact is that between elections, the citizen, organization or
corporation that is not part of a special interest group does not have . . . much to say about
what happens."
41. Id. at 127.
42. See Cooper, supra note 22, at 801.
43. See Statement by Arthur Gottschalk before the Illinois State Senate Executive Commit-
tee Subcommittee, Springfield, Illinois (Sept. 24, 1977). On file with the author, COMMON
CAUSE-CHICAGO, ILLINOIS.
44. See THE ILLINOIS GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN PROFILE, Project Poll, 123, 126 (1975) (inter-
view with Representative Anne Wilier, D-La Grange).
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at times gone beyond representation and advocacy to criminal activ-
ity. 45
Indirect lobbying is an attempt to mold a favorable body of public
opinion in order to influence public officials.4 6 The Christian Science
Monitor breaks this lobbying into four categories: bringing con-
stituents to the capitol; packing hearings and stacking the official re-
cord; writing letters, telegrams and mailgrams; and carrying the battle
to the home district. 47
Another facet of the lobbying system is the "pluralization of gov-
ernment" or the spreading of power in the decision-making process,
particularly in regulatory agencies. 48 For instance, thirty years ago,
an electrical utility was concerned mainly with the rule making and
rate making of the Illinois Commerce Commission. Today, the same
utility must concern itself with the Commerce Commission, the En-
vironmental Protection Agency, the Illinois Pollution Control Board,
and other agencies.
In the last two decades, Illinois news stories have contained
charges of serious misconduct by legislators and lobbyists. In 1951,
the truck lobby allegedly used a slush fund of $25,000 to beat a tax
increase, and in 1955 the chiropractors' association allegedly
employed a war chest of $143,500 to aid the passage of a licensing
bill. 49 The Union Electric Company, a St. Louis, Missouri public
utility, admitted in 1955 that it paid $35,000 in lobbying expenses to
push through a bill which saved the company from paying Illinois
franchise taxes. 50
The most sensational revelation occurred in 1965 with the publica-
tion of a transcript of a conversation among David Maslowsky, the
registered lobbyist for the Community Currency Exchange Associa-
tion, Sam Kaplan, former president of the association, and then pres-
ident Irving Gottlieb. 51 These discussions involved the payments to
45. See notes 51-57 and accompanying text infra.
46. See Cooper, supra note 22, at 801.
47. See Stuart, The New Lobbying: Whirring Computers, Floods of Mail, The Chris. Sci:
Mon. Oct. 9, 1975, at 14, col. 2.
48. See Haley & Kiss, supra note 40, at 127.
49. See Cleveland, Illinois Lobbyists on the Job, Chi. Daily News, Jan. 26, 1957, at 6, col.
1.
50. The $35,000 eventually appeared in the "envelope account" of then-State Auditor Or-
ville Hodge. The "envelope account" was an account which totaled some $1.5 million of state
funds, personally acquired by Orville Hodge. As a result of the discovery of this fund, he was
later convicted.
51. Gottlieb subsequently became a lobbyist for the same association. See note 118 &
accompanying text infra. Maslowsky, Kaplan and Gottlieb brought suit to stop an investigation
by the Sangamon County State's Attorney which resulted from the publication of the transcript.
They charged that the tapes were made in violation of the eavesdropping article of the Criminal
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various legislators of some $30,000 to kill a bill. Maslowsky was
quoted as stating: "What you might as well get used to is that every
time you have a legislative session, you come prepared with about
$50,000 ..... 52 1
The Community Currency Exchange Association was successful in
killing the legislation in 1965, and continued in this success until
1977. In their White Paper of 1977 on currency exchanges, the Better
Government Association said that " It] he State Legislature has failed
to enact a single substantive legislative reform in twenty-five years,
despite detailed testimony on numerous abuses that directly result
from the wording of the Currency Exchange Act." 53  They quote
Representative Lewis Caldwell as stating that Irving Gottlieb offered
a currency exchange to him in return for his killing a bill to lower
check cashing rates for welfare recipients. 54
In 1976 and 1977, two cases involving alleged bribery of state legis-
lators were tried and five legislators were convicted on charges of
extortion and mail fraud. 55  In the first case, the government charged
that Northern Illinois Ready Mix and Materials Association created a
$50,000 slush fund to be used as payoffs for votes on a bill raising
highway weight limits.56 The second case involved legislation requir-
ing a notation on automobile titles showing whether used autos previ-
ously had been rental cars. This was, in the vernacular of Springfield,
a "fetcher bill," designed to "fetch" a fee from the appropriate lob-
byist to kill the bill. This particular bill "fetched" a $1,500 fee, ac-
cording to the alleged testimony of the former lobbyist of the Illinois
Car and Truck Rental and Leasing Association. 57
CHRONICLE OF LOBBYING REGULATIONS
Over the years, such corrupt practices led states and the federal
government to realize that constitutional government alone was un-
Code. The Illinois Supreme Court found for the petitioners, but commented, "[W]e think there
is a sufficient showing of identity of the three petitioners as three of the persons whose conver-
sations were recorded." People v. Maslowsky, 34 111. 2d 456, 459 (1966).
52. Mabley, Here's How the American Got Tapes, Chi. Am., June 24, 1965, at 3, col. 1.
53. See The Better Government Association, The State and Community Currency Ex-
changes, White Paper, Jan. 1977. On file with the author, COMMON CAUSE-ILLINOIS.
54. Id. Irving Gottlieb allegedly asked Rep. Caldwell, "Senator Partee (former Senator Cecil
Partee) has one (currency exchange), Jimmy Carter (former representative) has one, when do
you want yours?" Id.
55. See, e.g., United States v. Craig, 74 CR Docket No. 879 (1974); United States v. Craig,
74 CR Docket No. 877 (1974).
56. See note 23 supra.




able to "maintain an optimum distance between private interests and
public power." 58 Consequently, barriers to unrestricted political ac-
tion by private interests were erected beginning in the late
nineteenth century. 59
Georgia was the first state to formally regulate lobbying. 60 Its
Constitution of 1877 provided that "lobbying is declared to be a crime
and the General Assembly shall enforce this provision ..... 61 The
Georgia legislature subsequently passed legislation defining lobbying
as "any personal solicitation of a member of the General Assembly
during the session thereof, by private interview, or other means not
addressed solely to the judgment.... "62
Other states adopted similar constitutional prohibitions, but not
until 1890 was a systematic lobbyist registration and disclosure law
enacted in Massachusetts. 63 Like its counterparts in the other states,
this Act came as a reaction to charges of improper influence. 64 The
Massachusetts Act became the model, both in structure and language,
for most subsequent state lobby laws, including Illinois'. Therefore, it
is useful to examine the constituent parts of the Massachusetts Act,
including registration, disclosure, administration, enforcement, penal-
ties, prohibitions and exemptions.
Registration was required of every person, including corporations
employing any person, to "promote or oppose in any manner directly
or indirectly the passage . . . of any legislation affecting the pecuniary
interests of an individual, association or corporation as distinct from
that of the whole people ..... 65 In addition to the employer's re-
gistration, lobbyists were required to register either as a legislative
counsel-that is, one who testifies and/or presents bills only to com-
mittee hearings-or as a legislative agent-one who promotes or op-
poses legislation in ways additional to committee hearings. 66 Re-
quired registration information included name, residence, occupation,
58. See LOBBYING AND THE LAw, supra note 16, at 3.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 27.
61. GA. CODE § 2-205 (1975).
62. Id. § 47-1000.
63. See 1890 Mass. Acts ch. 456, §§ 1-8.
64. In this instance, a legislative investigating committee disclosed that a Boston streetcar
company had employed thirty-five lobbyists and spent some $33,000 to promote a bill before
the legislature that would bring about the construction of an elevated streetcar line. See LOB-
BYING AND THE LAw, supra note 16, at 31.
65. 1890 Mass. Acts ch. 456, § 1. This language, delineating the individual pecuniary in-
terests as distinct from the people as a whole, was subsequently deleted in 1891, but similar
language was used later in the 1957 Illinois Act. See note 99 and accompanying text infra.
66. See 1890 Mass. Acts ch. 456, § 2.
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date of employment, terms of employment and the special subjects of
legislation with which the lobbyist intended to be concerned. 67
Thirty days after the close of each session, every employer, counsel
and agent was to disclose all expenses paid or incurred in promoting
or opposing any bill. 68
Violations of the Act could result in prosecution by the Attorney
General and penalties including a prohibition from lobbying for up to
three years, fines and imprisonment. 6 9 The Act was essentially per-
missive, except that it prohibited the payment of any fees contingent
upon the passage or defeat of legislation. 70 There were no specific
exemptions, but the terms of registration did not include those indi-
viduals who lobbied on their own behalf.
Within thirty years, some fifteen states had copied or accepted a
modified version of this law. 71 The majority of these statutes are not
restrictive except for the standard prohibition of contingency fees. 72
The states recognized that lobbyists must not be prevented from ful-
filling a very important and integral role in the decision-making pro-
cess. 73 This recognition went beyond the obvious necessity of pro-
tecting the First Amendment right to petition. Lobbyists provide the
initiative for a large percentage of legislation. They help draw the
lines of issue discussion, help to resolve conflicts in some issues, and
provide invaluable information to the legislator. 74
Equally important, however, is the pressing danger to the public
interest which results from unregulated lobbying. Lobbying can have
an impact correlated not to the public interest but to the amount of
money spent. An interest group which has the funds to employ a
full-time, professional lobbyist may have a significant advantage over
groups which must rely on non-professional members who volunteer
time from their regular pursuits. In an article on volunteer lobbyists,
two commentators argue that a professional, because of his knowl-
67. Id.
68. id. 6.
69. Id. § 7.
70. Id. § 3.
71. See LOBBYING AND THE LAW, supra note 16, at 34-39.
72. There are some exceptions. California, Idaho, Iowa, Nebraska, Nevada, Oregon and the
District of Columbia restrict the level of expenditures made by lobbyists which benefit public
officials. See LOBBYING REPORTS, Surge of Legislative Activity on Lobbying Reported in State
by State (April 11, 1977). Lobbyists in Oklahoma and South Dakota are prohibited from engag-
ing in any activities beyond presenting their arguments in a committee hearing. See OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 314 (West 1958); S. D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. 2-12-9 (1967).
73. See Smith, supra note 17, at 674.




edge, experience, and availability of time, has an overwhelming ad-
vantage over the volunteer. They note that a professional can find
sponsors for legislation quickly, can have research available in a
shorter time, and has the time to attend interim study committee
sessions. 7
5
Although the amount of money spent is not the sole criterion for
determining legislation's passage or defeat, it can have a significant
impact. When the stakes are high, lobbying can go beyond petition
and advocacy and can lead to exorbitant spending directed toward
acquiring influence, rather than presenting the merits of a position.
Lobby disclosure laws attempt to alleviate the above danger by ful-
filling three primary needs. First, legislators must know the source
and size of pressures to which they are subjected in order to compen-
sate, in their own minds, on unequal access to the system. 76
Second, the state has a substantial interest in deterring actual cor-
ruption and avoiding the appearance of corruption. Lobby disclosure
makes it easier for public officials to resist undue or unethical pres-
sures, and provides the tools to investigate unethical practices. If lob-
byists are subject to disclosure, both they and public officials will
have to carefully consider their actions to avoid a negative appear-
ance. While disclosure reports will probably not disclose expenditures
made for bribery, they will provide tools to examine possible illegal
activities. For instance, illegal campaign contributions are not re-
ported pursuant to the Illinois campaign finance disclosure law,77 yet
the State Board of Elections in a recent order found "1) the launder-
ing of contributions 2) with the purpose of influencing actions of the
Illinois Department of Public Aid with respect to medical pay-
ments."78 Furthermore, a Cook County Grand Jury recently in-
dicted two individuals involved in the above actions. " The investi-
75. See Gale & Gale, The Volunteer Lobbyist in the State Legislature, 52 ORE. L. REv. 69,
80 (1972).
76. See Leonhardt, The Channeling of Lobbying Into the Public Interest, 49 CONN. BAR J.
475, 477-78 (1972). As the United States Supreme Court stated in United States v. Harris, 347
U.S. 612 (1954):
Present-day legislative complexities are such that individual members of Congress
cannot be expected to explore the myriad pressures to which they are regularly
subjected. Yet full realization of the American ideal of government by elected rep-
resentatives depends to no small extent on their ability to properly evaluate such
pressures. Otherwise the voice of the people may all too easily be drowned out by
the voice of special interest groups seeking favored treatment while masquerading
as proponents of the public weal.
Id. at 625.
77. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 46, § 9 (1975).
78. See Order of the Illinois State Board of Elections, C-77-2-23-19 C. D. (Nov. 22, 1977).




gation which led to the Board Order and the indictments were based
on public documents filed pursuant to the campaign financial disclo-
sure act. 
8 0
Finally, lobby disclosure can provide the electorate with a means of
determining whose interests public officials are serving. As the Sup-
reme Court of the State of Washington stated:
The electorate, we believe, has the right to know of the sources
and magnitude of financial and persuasional influences upon gov-
ernment. The voting public should be able to evaluate the perfor-
mance of their elected officials in terms of representation of the
elector's interest in contradistinction to those interests represented
by lobbyists. Public information and the disclosure required . . . of
lobbyists and their employers may provide the electorate with a
heretofore unavailable perspective regarding the role that money
and special influence play in government decision making. 81
An informed electorate and an informed legislature constitute the es-
sence of a democratic society.
REGULATION OF LOBBYING IN ILLINOIS
Illinois has had two acts regulating lobbying in the last twenty
years, both enacted as a response to allegations of improper influence
on the part of special interests.
During the Union Electric Company investigation in 1955, legislation
was introduced only hours after a federal grand jury had heard its last
witness testify about the $35,000 payment made by the St. Louis
public utility for lobbying activities. The $35,000 turned up in former
State Auditor Orville Hodge's "envelope account." 82 The bill,8 3 in-
troduced by Senator William Lynch, required any individual who
"engages in influencing legislation" as the representative of an organi-
zation to register with the state, as did every organization that ex-
pended more than $500 influencing legislation. 84 Both the individual
and the organization were required to make monthly disclosure re-
ports of the amounts of money spent for this purpose. 5 This bill
80. See Text of a letter from Richard Anderson, Administrator of the Public Disclo-
sure Section, Illinois State Board of Election (March 29, 1978). On file with the author, COM-
MON CAUSE-ILLINOIS.
81. Fritz v. Gorton, 83 Wash. 2d 275, 309, 517 P.2d 911, 951 (1974).
82. See Hanson, Asks State Probe of Lobbying, Chi. Daily News, Jan. 10, 1957, at 6, col. 3.
83. See S.B. 7, 70th Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (1957).
84. Id. §§ 1,2,3.
85. id. §§ 2,4.
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passed the Senate Judiciary Committee but, under pressure from var-
ious lobbies,8 6 was returned to committee where it died.
In place of the Lynch Bill, the Judiciary Committee sponsored a
substitute, Senate Bill 629.87 This compromise bill required registra-
tion of lobbyists, regular reports of expenditures, and provided for
enforcement by State's Attorneys, with penalties of up to two years
in jail, a $15,000 fine, or both. Reporters, publishers, broadcasters,
persons appearing before committees without compensation, and per-
sons performing professional services such as drafting or rendering
opinions were not required to register. 88 Those who registered were
required to file monthly reports with the Secretary when the legisla-
ture was in session, and quarterly reports when it was not, of all
"expenditures of money or other things of value" with the following
exceptions: travel, personal sustenance, lodging, office expenses,
stenographic and clerical expenses, and the cost of internal mail-
ings. 89 Expenditures of less than $10 could be reported in total
amounts rather than in detail. 90 Contingency fees were prohibited91
and the Secretary of State was responsible for maintaining a register
and for providing the appropriate forms. 92  Violations could be prose-
cuted by the State's Attorney of the county where the violation oc-
curred or by the Sangamon County State's Attorney. 93 Violations by
individuals were classified as a felony punishable by up to two years
in jail, a $5,000 fine, or both. Any corporation found guilty was sub-
ject to a fine of $5,000.94
The Judiciary Committee proposal, however, was not adopted at
this time. In its place, a bill sponsored by then-Representative Paul
86. See Dreiske, Lobbyists Win Round Against Assembly Resignation Bill, Chi. Sun Times,
Feb. 28, 1957, at 22, col. 1. The lobbies allegedly exerting this pressure included the Illinois
Federation of Retail Associations, Illinois Manufacturers Association, Illinois Bankers Associa-
tion, Illinois State Chamber of Commerce, Chicago Association of Commerce and Industry, and
others.
87. S.B. 629, 70th Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (1957).
88. Id. § 4.
89. Id. § 6.
90. Id.
91. Id. § 8. This prohibition was a principle existing in Illinois case law since 1898. The
Illinois Supreme Court held in Critchfield v. Bermudez Asphalt Paving co., 174 Ill. 466, 478
(1898) that "If the performance of the obligations imposed by the contract has an evil tendency
or furnished a temptation to use improper means, the contract is illegal and 'contra bonas
mores.
92. See S.B. 629, § 7, 70th Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (1957).
93. Id. § 11.
94. Id. § 10. S.B.629 did pass the Senate, but it never left the House committee studying
the legislation. It was not without irportance, however, because it was reintroduced in several




Powell passed both chambers and was signed into law.9 5 The Act,
labeled by the Chicago Sun Times as "Powell's Toothless Travesty," 96
required registration with the Secretary of State of every person
employed "to promote or oppose in any manner the passage by the
legislature of any legislation affecting the interests of any individual,
association or corporation as distinct from those of the whole people
of the State .... "97 One observer wrote that "most astute lobbyists
will soon be found representing only the interests of the 'whole
people of the state,' and no one of lesser import, in pushing bills in
which their clients are interested." 9 Therefore, almost seventy
years after the Massachusetts Legislature had rejected the distinction
between private and public legislation. Illinois adopted language
identical to the first Massachusetts Act. 99
This Act was to be administered by the Secretary of State who
would prepare and keep a legislative docket containing the names of
all registered lobbyists and the name of each lobbyist's employer. The
Secretary also published a bulletin containing the information from
the docket and distributed this bulletin to the General Assembly,
constitutional officers, and the press. 100 The Secretary of State,
however, was not responsible for enforcing the act. The Act did not
specify who was responsible.
Even apart from the major loophole regarding who must register,
this Act never accomplished the purpose of making public the mag-
nitude of special interest influence. Paul Powell's bill merely required
registration. The disclosure of expenditures requirement was not
added until 1969.
Although legislation to amend the 1957 act to include disclosure
and to change the registration requirement was introduced regularly,
95. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 63, §§ 110-113 (1975).
96. See Powells's Toothless Travesty, Chi. Sun-Times May 20, 1957, at 21, col. 1. This
editorial further commented that "(tihe Powell bill could not have been better if it had been
drafted by a lobbyist-and it may well have been."
97. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 63, § 110 (1975).
98. Packard, The Illinois Lobbying Act, Fact or Phantom? 47 ILL. B.J. 436, 440 (1959).
Although this language was deleted in the 1969 Act, the Illinois Government Ethics Act, ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 601 (1975) states that a legislator may not engage in lobbying for com-
pensation (§ 602-101). Lobbying is defined as "promoting or opposing ... any legislative matter
affecting the interests of any association or corporation as distinct from those of the people of
the state as a whole."
There is, however, another provision in the Illinois statutes. Chap. 38, § 91, stating, "No
member of the General Assembly shall accept or receive, directly or indirectly, any money or
other valuable thing, from any corporation, company or person, for any vote or influence he
may give or withhold ....
99. See notes 65-68 and accompanying text supra.
100. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 63, § 111 (1959).
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not until 1965 did the legislature again consider seriously the ques-
tion of the relationship between private groups and public power.
That year, then-State Representative Adlai Stevenson III introduced a
bill requiring registration and disclosure by any person seeking to
promote or oppose legislation. 1 1 Stevenson's bill, House Bill 264,
was almost identical to the Senate Judiciary Committee Bill of
1957.102 Although Stevenson introduced this legislation early in the
1965 session, it was presumed dead until shortly after the publication
of the Community Currency Exchange Association officers' taped
conversations. The bill was quickly revived and passed on to the Se-
nate by a 134 to 14 vote. '0 3 The bill was killed there, however, by a
parliamentary maneuver in the closing days of the session.
Lobbying legislation was subsequently introduced by the President
Pro Tempore of the State Senate, W. Russell Arrington. He prefiled
legislation 104 in November of 1966, saying that lobbying legislation
"will protect the general public and the great majority of lobbyists
from the abuses by the few scoundrels among them." 105 It did not
pass in 1967, but was reintroduced in the 76th General Assembly
(1969) and sponsored again by Senator Arrington as Senate Bill
105.106 This time the bill was passed and signed into law.
DEFICIENCIES OF THE ILLINOIS LOBBYING ACT
Edgar Lane, the foremost historian of state lobbying laws, wrote
that these laws are "narrow in origin and approach and they have for
the most part been enacted in haste and allowed to atrophy in
leisure-and all the while the little world they seek to capture goes
101. H.B. 264, 74th Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (1965).
102. Stevenson added two new items to the registration requirements of the 1957 bill. The
legislation stated that a $1,000 expenditure threshold must be reached before triggering regist-
ration and disclosure requirements and that a lobbyist, when registering, must disclose the
amount of compensation received from each employer. Id. §§ 4, 5. Once registered, every
lobbyist would be required to report in detail all expenditures made, for what purpose, to
whom, and all compensation and payments for expenses received directly or indirectly. Id. § 6.
Further, no expenditures were exempt from reporting, but personal office expenses, food, lodg-
ing, travel and expenditures of $10 or less could be reported in the aggregate. Id. The penalties
for violations were the same except for the addition of disbarment from lobbying for compensa-
tion for three years. Id. § 10. This section also included a presumption of lobbying for compen-
sation if the person was discovered lobbying during the three year period of disbarment, unless
rebutted with competent evidence.
103. See generally, The Legislative Reference Bureau, Synopsis and Digest, 74th Gen. As-
sembly (1965).
104. See S.B. 3, 75th Gen. Assembly 1st Sess. (1967).
105. Maier, GOP Offers Ethics Law for Officials, Chi. Daily News, Nov. 30, 1966, at 1, col.
2.
106. S.B. 105, 76th Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (1969).
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right on changing." 107 Lane's assessment is appropriate to a discus-
sion of the Illinois Act. An examination of the constituent parts of
registration and reporting, exemptions and restrictions, and adminis-
tration and enforcement will demonstrate that the Illinois Act is in-
complete, loophole-ridden and unenforced.
In the section defining "Persons Required to Register," 108 the 1969
Act broadened the registration requirements of previous bills 109 to
include "any person ...on behalf of any person other than himself
• 110 who promotes or opposes legislation. This means that there
are three criteria for determining the requirement of registration of a
person as a lobbyist. These are: (1) receiving compensation; (2) repre-
senting a person other than yourself; and (3) acting as an employee of
another person. 11
As has been mentioned previously, Illinois had only 379 lobbyists
in 1975 and 324 in 1976 registered pursuant to the above provisions.
Exacting comparisons between the number and kinds of registered
lobbyists in the various states are impossible to make because the
political climate varies dramatically from state to state, 112 and because
state lobbying laws vary. 1 13 It is interesting to note, however, that
in Maryland there were 361 registered lobbyists in 1975. 1 1 4
Washington state had 650 lobbyists in 1975, and 488 in 1976.115 In-
deed, it seems odd that Illinois has fewer registered lobbyists than
states with smaller populations or lesser economies. This leads to the
conclusion that the present regulatory provisions of the Act could fail
to produce full registration.
107. LOBBYING AND THE LAW, supra note 16, at 11, 12.
108. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 63, § 172 (1975).
109. See S.B. 629, 70th Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (1957); H.B. 264, 74th Gen. Assembly, 1st
Sess. (1965).
110. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 63, § 173(a) (1975).
111. Id. § 173.
112. See LOBBYING AND TIlE LAW, supra note 16, at 110.
113. For example, Maryland requires the registration of every "legislative agent" who is a
person compensated by an employer to "promote, advocate, influence or oppose" any matter
before the General Assembly. MD. ANN. CODE art. 40, § 5 (1957). Washington State requires
the registration of any lobbyist, defined as any person who "shall lobby on his own behalf or
another's." WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.020 (Supp. 1976). Lobbying is attempting to influence
the passage or defeat of any legislation or the adoption or rejection of any rule, standard or rate
set by a state agency, Id. Those persons who restrict lobbying to no more than four days a quarter and
spend less than $15 for or on behalf of a public official are exempt from the Washington registration.
114. See COMMON CAUSE-MARYLAND, Lobbying Activities in Maryland (December 1975).
On file with the author-COMMON CAUSE.




Further, there are lobbyists in Illinois who appear to come under
the provisions of the Illinois Act, yet have never registered. 116 Al-
though former Community Currency Exchange Association president
Irving Gottlieb lobbied in Springfield, 117 he never registered.
Gottlieb was quoted as stating that his activities were designed to
"[m]ake friends and influence people-that's what a lobbyist does-
and explain bills." Asked if he had ever read the 1969 Lobby Act,
Gottlieb said, "I've never looked at the Act." 118 The Secretary of
State has noted that it is not the responsibility of his office to enforce
the Act,119 and neither the Attorney General nor any State's Attorney
has ever brought indictments for violation of the registration re-
quirements.
Another aspect of registration deficiency is the absence of any non-
individual "persons" as registrants. As used in this act, "[p]erson
means any individual, firm, partnership, commitee, association, cor-
poration, or any other organization or group of persons." 120 The de-
finition of "person," however, does contemplate the registration of
non-individuals because the Act exempts from disclosure the "cost of
mailings to members . " and a provides a specific fine of
$10,000 for any "corporation which violates this act ..... 122 Appa-
rently, no non-individual "person" has registered since the publica-
tion of the first list of registered lobbyists by the Secretary of
State. 123
Moreover, the Secretary's office has not sought the registration of
any "persons" beyond individuals. 124  In a recent opinion,125 the At-
torney General stated that the registration requirements contained in
Section 173 of the Act apply "to all entities enumerated under the
116. See Pound & Zekman, How State Lobbyists Evade Law, Chi. Sun-Times, April 24,
1977, at 3, col. 
4.
117. Pound & Zekman, How Currency Exchange Unit Slipped Cash to Pols, Chi. Sun-Times,
Dec. 9, 1976, at 1, col. 1.
118. Id.
119. See note 116 supra.
120. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 63, § 172 (1975).
121. Id. §176 (b).
122. Id. § 10.
123. See LOBBYIST LIST, supra note 32 (1971-1977).
124. The Secretary regularly mails registration and disclosure forms to registered lobbyists at
the appropriate times. However, it is the author's experience as a registered lobbyist for five
years that the organizations he represented have not received a request for registration, nor a
request for a disclosure report. The author, probably like most other lobbyists and lobbyist
employers, assumed that the Secretary, in mailing only to individuals, was requesting all that
the act required.
125. Op. Att'y. Gen. S-1319 (Dec. 12, 1977).
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statutory definition of person" as contained in Section 172.126 The
Secretary of State mailed copies of the Attorney General's opinion to
those registered under the Act, and revised both the registration and
disclosure forms.' 2 7 The registration form includes a new category
for the person or persons employed or retained by the registrant. The
General Instructions state that "[a]nyone who represents any entity
must complete this form in his own behalf. Also the entity must file a
separate form with the name of the entity wherever 'name' is re-
quired." 128 The Secretary's office has not, however, mailed the re-
gistration forms to "persons" not already registered, 129 nor has it
stipulated whether it will require retroactive registration for 1977.130
The implications of this interpretation are far-reaching. The regis-
tration of lobbies and lobbyists and their subsequent disclosure
should produce a dramatic increase in amounts disclosed since indi-
rect lobbying must now be reported. Normally, an individual lobbyist
will not make or authorize all expenditures made during the course of
a campaign. For instance, thousands of dollars could be expended
purchasing advertisements urging the passage or defeat of legislation,
but because an individual lobbyist did not make or authorize these
expenditures, 131 he is not required to report them. With the registra-
tion of lobbies, these expenditures will now be reported. Also, ex-
penditures made by entities as compensation to lobbyists 132 and as
reimbursements made for a lobbyist's travel, lodging or personal
sustenance 133 will now be required.
126. The Attorney General further stipulated in this opinion that an attorney working as a
lobbyist for a client retaining the firm employing him must register, disclosing the client's name
and that "the law firm would have to register under the act because it is within the Section
172(a) definition of 'person' and because it has undertaken to perform lobbying services for its
client."
127. Letter from Donald D. Ed, Director of the Index Division, Office of Secretary of State,
to all registered lobbyists (Dec. 30, 1977).
128. See Lobbyist Registration Statement, Index Division, Office of Secretary of State (Dec.
30, 1977).
129. The letter states, "The Lobbyist Registration Statement has also been revised and a copy
is enclosed should you desire to register for the 1978 legislative session."
130. The Secretary cannot be presumed to know the identity of all persons who must regis-
ter, but he does have available to him the names and addresses of persons employing or retain-
ing 1977 registrants.
131. Section 176 of the Act provides that "[e]very person registering shall ... file ... a
report under oath of all expenditures made by him ...." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 176 (1975).
132. Compensation is an expenditure made for the purpose of promoting or opposing legisla-
tion. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 63 § 176 (1975).
133. The exemption from reporting these expenditures is for "the registrant" and "his per-
sonal sustenance, lodging and travel," not the expenditures made by an agent of the registrant.
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The Attorney General's inclusive interpretation still leaves a major
loophole in the registration requirements of the Act. "Persons" at-
tempting to influence the executive branch of goverment are not cov-
ered even though "political interest groups have treated statehouse
and state office building as inseparable parts of the same political ar-
chitecture." 134 One spokesperson testifying against a proposed Il-
linois law to ban non-returnable containers said, "We have been ap-
pearing off and on for three years before the Illinois Pollution Control
Board .... " The spokesperson further commented, "We have had
thirteen days of hearings with just a total collective industry expense
of almost in excess of a million dollars right now." 135 Since the 1969
Act does not include the registration of those persons seeking to in-
fluence executive branch agency decisions, no means is available to
determine who is trying to influence these decisions or how much is
being expended.
Once registered, every person must file at least three reports dis-
closing all expenditures made to promote or oppose legislation "show-
ing in detail the person or legislator to whom or for whose benefit
such expenditures were made .... Expenditures of $25 or less ...
may be reported in total amounts." 136 However, exemptions from
the reporting requirements are provided for expenditures made by
the registrant as a member of a study commission or committee. Also
exempt are reasonable and bona fide expenditures for internal ex-
penses, personal sustenance, lodging, travel, and expenditures to
honor or promote the candidacy of a legislator. 137
Ninety-five percent of Illinois' registered lobbyists reported no ex-
penditures in 1975, and the five per cent who did report disclosed a
total of $67,856.138 Eighty-eight percent of those lobbyists registered
134. See LOBBYING AND THE LAW, supra note 16, at 10.
135. See Hearing on H.B. 1838 Before the Illinois Committee on Environment, Energy and
Natural Resources, 79th Gen. Assembly (1975) (statement of Don Kinney, Vice-President of
Coca-Cola Bottling Co.). '
136. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 63, § 176 (1975).
137. Id. Most of these exemptions were written into the direct predecessor of this act, S.B.
3, 75th Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (1977), and the 1969 Bill in the 76th General Assembly re-
tained them. The clause, "for services rendered or to be rendered," was first added in 1967.
Read apart from the context of a registered person making an expenditure (e.g:, salary) as
payment to an agent for services rendered, this clause seems to establish a quid pro quo defini-
tion of an expenditure made which would need be reported. Since this is illegal pursuant to
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 91 (1975) it is unlikely that this kind of expenditure would openly be
reported. This definition is poorly constructed and is probably surplusage when considering the
Act as a whole.
138. COMMON CAUSE-ILLINOIS AND THE BETTER GOVERNMENT ASS'N. Unpublished study
based on the expenditure reports on file with the Secretary of State for 1975 and 1976 (Feb-
ruary 1977). Two groups accounted for $36,000 of the total expenditures. On file with the
author, COMMON CAUSE-ILLINOIS AND BETTER GOVERNMENT ASS'N.
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in 1976 reported no expenditures and the twelve per cent who did
report disclosed $70,970. 139 A breakdown of lobbying expenditures
according to interests represented follows: 140
Interest Represented Amount Disclosed
1975 1976
Agriculture 0 0
Banking and Finance $ 4,567 $ 3,328
Counties, Townships




Manufacturing and Retail 3,018 3,871
Miscellaneous 768 1,690
Medical and Health 3,268 433
Occupational and Professional 620 400
Public and Ideological 18,624 51,095
Trade Association 3,983 6,739
Transportation 0 0
Utilities 5,373 2,507
During 1975, $1,383,000 was reported by lobbyists in Maryland, 141
and $467,000 was disclosed by some 502 lobbyist employers in Con-
necticut. 142  Expenditures of $3 million were disclosed by lobbyists
in the State of New York for 1977,143 and in California, $19,094,000
was reported by lobbyists in 1975, and $20,925,000 in 1976.144 Cer-
139. Id. Again, two groups accounted for over one-half the reported expenditures.
140. Id. Expenditure is defined as "a payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of
money or anything of value, and includes a contract, promise or agreement, whether or not
legally enforceable, to make an expenditure, for services rendered or to be rendered for pro-
moting or opposing the passage of any legislation .... " Id.
141. See Lobbying Activities in the State of Maryland-COMMON CAUSE-MARYLAND.
142. See Leonhardt, The Channeling of Lobbying into the Public Interest, 49 CONN. B.J.
475, 477 (1975).
143. See Press Release of Mario Cuomo, Secretary of State, New York (Nov. 3, 1977). On file
with the author, COMMON CAUSE-ILLINOIS.
144. See Fair Political Practices Commission, State of California, $40 Million to Influence
California Government, a Report on Lobbying (August 1977). Proportional relationships be-
tween state disclosure data do not exist because the political climate of each state is unique and
their lobby laws are different.
Maryland requires the legislative agents and their employers to jointly file an itemized ac-
count of all "salaries, fees, expenses or other compensation paid or to be paid. ... MD. ANN.
CODE art. 40, § 10 (1977).
Lobbyists, lobbyists' employers, and "[a]ny person who directly or indirectly makes payments
to influence legislative or administrative action" should disclose "[t]he total amount of payments
1978] LOBBYING LAWS
tain interests have affiliates which are active in more than one state.
A comparison of several of these interests for the same period indi-
cates the following: 145
to influence legislative and administrative action . . . in California. CAL. GOVT CODE §§ 86108,
86109 (1976).
Connecticut required in 1975 that "Each person, firm, corporation, or association . . . shall
file . . . an itemized verified statement . . . [of] all items paid, incurred or promised, directly or
indirectly, in connection with the legislation pending at the last previous session . . . ." CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. ch. 16, § 2-45 (1975). In 1976, the New York requirements were identical to
those of Connecticut.
145. Because the issue of branch banking has been so divisive among bankers in Illinois,
there are three trade associations for bankers in Springfield. Maryland and California each have
only one banker's trade association.
All fifteen Illinois associations perform many functions apart from lobbying, but all fifteen
have at least one registered lobbyist and most have two or more who spend a significant amount
of time in lobbying efforts. If the above fifteen organizations devoted only 50 per cent of their
budget to lobbying, they would spend $2,629,846. If they devoted 20 per cent of their budget
to lobbying, they would collectively expend $1,753,230, or if they spent only five per cent of
their collective budgets, $438,308 would be spent.
These same associations reported to the Internal Revenue Service the following annual
budget expenditures for one year of this two-year time period. (Note: The amounts are total
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In comparison with the reported expenditures of lobbyists in other
states, the $70,000 reported by Illinois lobbyists is a meaningless
measure of private interest influence in Springfield.
The reasons for this are similar to the registration situation:
loopholes in the Act and an almost non-existent administration policy.
The exemptions from reporting demonstrate major statutory deficien-
cies, including "internal expenses such as office expenses, steno-
graphic and clerical assistance, cost of mailings to members, and or-
dinary mailing lists and cost of regular and routine research." 149 If
"internal expenses" were purely supplementary to the activity of lob-
bying, perhaps they should be exempted. But, in this age of technical
legislation, research, for example, is critical to resolution of such is-
sues as the permissible level of sulfur dioxide emissions. It is also an
integral part of much lobbying in a modern age. Another example is
the cost of mailings. Mailings are part and parcel of grassroots lobby-
ing and are used regularly. Public interest lobbies such as Common
Cause remain effective lobbies because of regular mailings to their
members on pending or proposed legislation. Other organizations also
use this technique and some have charged that Illinois public utilities
are using this technique in mailings to their subscribers. 150
Pursuant to the Attorney General's opinion of December 12,
1977,151 those "persons" newly interpreted as being required to regis-
ter, should also begin to follow the disclosure requirements. This will
close one of the past loopholes. The opinion also interprets the provi-
sion that "[e]xpenditures of $25 or less .. .may be reported in total
amounts rather than in detail," 152 to mean that "the exemption from
149. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 63, § 176(b) (1975).
150. The Illinois Public Action Council charged in a complaint filed before the Illinois Com-
merce Commission that Illinois Power and Central Illinois Public Service Company sent a mail-
ing to electrical service customers, "disseminating their views on matters of public controversy."
The mailing, according to the Council, concerned specific legislation pending before the Gen-
eral Assembly. Illinois Public Action Council v. All Illinois Electrical Public Utilities, No. 77-
0311 (May, 1977). Prior to the development of the disclosure forms adopted in December 1977,
the Index Division of the Secretary of State's Office mailed disclosure reports that consisted of a
copy of Section 6 (Reports) and Section 10 (Penalties) of the Act and an essentially blank form
entitled "Lobbyist Expenditure Report for [and space for the appropriate month]." This form
had a line at the top for the registrant's name and lines at the bottom for a signature and
notarization. The new reporting form, similarly entitled "Lobbyist Expenditure Statement" is
two pages in length with the first page requiring the name of the registrant, the date with
blanks for the name and address of "any person ... to whom, or for whose benefit expenditures
in excess of $25 were made," the date of the expenditure, and the amount of each expenditure.
Presumably, "lobbyist" here is merely a reference to the title of the Act and is not a descriptive
term. Page two has space for the name and address of any person for whom, or for whose
benefit expenditures of $25 or less were aggregated, and space for signature and notarization.
151. Op. Att'y Gen. S-1319 (Dec. 12, 1977).
152. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 63, § 176 (1975).
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reporting in detail expenditures under $25 does not go beyond this
limited aggregation, and the report must still show the person or
legislator to whom or on whose benefit expenditures under $25 were
made." 153 However, the major problem in the interpretation of the
reporting requirements has been the absence of interpretation.
The new "Lobbyist Expenditure Statement" introduced in 1977
makes the requirements clearer than the previous form, but provides
no detailed instructions. Instead, the Secretary of State reproduces
sections 6 and 10 of the Act, and quotes from the Attorney General's
opinion. Every registrant can still interpret much of the Act as he
wishes. 154
The Index Division of the Secretary of State does not follow up on
faulty or incomplete disclosure reports. 155  This office maintains that
the Secretary of State's role is purely administration, not enforcement
nor interpretation. The Secretary of State does have the authority,
however, to request opinions from the Attorney General. 156  Al-
though not specifically required to do so, the Secretary could present
information to the State's Attorney or the Attorney General regarding
incomplete or allegedly inaccurate reports. The State's Attorney of
Sangamon County and the Attorney General could also regularly re-
view the registration and the reports on file with the Secretary. The
root of the problem is that no one has specific obligations under the
Act 157 and that, as a result, no one has taken on the responsibility of
insuring compliance.
153. Op. Att'y Gen. S-1319 (Dec. 12, 1977). Lobbyists had been interpreting Section 176 as
an exemption from reporting anything but a catch-all figure. For instance, one lobbyist disclosed
in his July 1977 report "$4,000, no expenditures in excess of $25 per occasion," Gerald W.
Shea, Personal Lobbyist Disclosure Rep. filed Sec. of State. and another lobbyist disclosed in
his July report, $217 in lunches at the Sangamo Club. Robert E. Cook Personal Lobbyist.
Disclosure Rep. filed Sec. of State.
154. In the past, some registrants have developed interpretations that challenge credulity.
For instance, the Illinois State Medical Society held a dinner and reception attended by some
society members and by members of the General Assembly at the same time that the legislature
was considering malpractice legislation. The cost of the reception was $12,000, according to the
Better Government Association, yet it was never disclosed. Donald Udstuen, a lobbyist for the
society, when asked why this cost was not disclosed, replied, according to the Chicago Sun-
Times, "only those expenses incurred while talking to a legislator about a specific piece of
legislation need be reported. The reception was a social event." Pound and Zekman, How State
Lobbyists Evade Law, Chi. Sun-Times, April 24, 1977, at 3, col. 4.
155. See Oster & Watson, Lobby-law Effectiveness Found to be Zero, Chi. Sun-Times,
June 6, 1973, at 5, col. 1.
156. Opinion No. S-1319 was requested in this case, however, by the chairman of the Senate
Executive Committee, Senator Don Wooten.
157. While the United States District Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois has suc-
cessfully prosecuted criminal activity involving state lobbying activities, see note 55 supra, state
law enforcement authorities have not. There has been no litigation involving this act.
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Another question which has arisen is exactly who is not required to
register. The Act delineates seven categories of persons not required
to register and subsequently disclose: (1) those who only testify as
witnesses before committees without compensation; (2) persons own-
ing or employed by a newspaper, periodical, radio or television sta-
tion which disseminates news, comment or editorials on legislation;
(3) those performing professional services such as rendering opinions
or drafting legislation; (4) employees of state government who appear
before committees; 158 (5) the General Assembly's staff; (6) persons
who, although reimbursed by an employer, appear for a registrant at
the written request of a legislator to present expert testimony; and (7)
a full-time employee of a church or religious organization who repre-
sents only that organization in order to promote its doctrine. 159 The
problem has arisen not from any of these specific exemptions but
rather from a presumed exemption from registration for lawyer lob-
byists, since this would require them to disclose their clients, an al-
leged violation of lawyer-client confidentiality. When asked why he
never registered as a lobbyist, Irving Gottlieb was quoted as saying,
"There was no reason to register.... I was on a legal retainer." 160
In this same Sun-Times article, Gottlieb argued that he was repre-
senting himself as the owner of a currency exchange. In testifying
before legislative committees, however, he signed witness slips listing
himself as the representative of the Community Currency Exchange
Association, not himself.
There have been sound legal arguments to refute the lawyer-
lobbyist exemption claimed by Gottlieb, 16 ' and this issue was appa-
rently resolved by the Attorney General's 1977 opinion stating that
"when a law firm is retained as a lobbyist, the attorney or attorneys
158. Proponents of lobbyist disclosure reforms are especially critical of the continuation of
this particular exemption in H. B. 1820. These critics argue that legislative liasons of state gov-
ernment agencies should be required to register and disclose. A close reading, of § 174(d)
however, would indicate that any legislative liason is required to register if he does more than
appear before a legislative committee to explain how legislation will affect his particular agency.
This means that any legislative liasons or any other state officials who promote or oppose the
passage of any legislation are required to register. Most legislative liasons, in the author's ex-
perience, are involved in all phases of legislative activity, including the promotion or opposition
to legislation. According to the Secretary of State's lists of registered lobbyists, no legislatative
liasons are registered. For more information on this subject, see McCahill, Private Lobbyists
Urge Same Rules for Public Lobbyists, Chi. Sun-Times, September 23, 1977, at 46, col. 1.
159. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 63, § 176 (1975).
160. See note 116 supra.
161. Selkur, Attorney-Client Privilege as It Applies to Registration Under the Illinois Lobby-




employed by the firm who actually carry on the lobbying activity
should disclose the name of the entity for which lobbying is being
done." 162 This opinion and the revised forms drafted by the Secret-
ary of State have considerably strengthened the 1969 Act. Major
structural problems still exist; new legislation is still needed.
PROPOSED REFORMS OF THE ILLINOIS LOBBYING ACT
During the 1978 session of the General Assembly, some six bills
amending the current Act are being considered. Five of these bills
would strengthen lobby regulation significantly 163 and the sixth
would cripple the new life given the Act by the Attorney General's
opinion. 164 At the time of the writing of this Article the outcome of
any of these proposals is uncertain. Consequently, it is more mean-
ingful to discuss what reforms are essential.
First, section 172 of the Act, "Definition," should be amended.
The language defining an expenditure should be changed to clarify or
delete "the services rendered" clause. Also, lobbying should be de-
fined broadly enough to include personal communication and the so-
licitation of others to communicate with an official to influence legisla-
tion or administrative action.165 Lobbying in the quasi-legislative
functions of state agencies such as rule making and rate making
should also be included.
Second, the requirements for registration should be focused not
merely on whether or not a person lobbies, but on how much is
expended in seeking to influence legislation or administrative action.
A threshold of $1,000 seems a reasonable level of expenditures to
trigger registration and disclosure. 166 With this threshold, significant
lobbying activities would be disclosed while de minimus activities
would not. This would mean the current threefold registration re-
quirement would be supplanted by this expenditure minimum which
would trigger the mechanism for registration. Also, registration
should be required of those whose lobbying efforts are directed to-
ward non-legislators such as: legislative staff, the Governor and his
162. Op. Att'y Gen. S-1319 (Dec. 12, 1977).
163. See note 15 and accompanying text infra.
164. S.B. 1605, 80th General Assembly (1978 Sess.).
165. The current Act's definition of lobbying as contained in the "'Registration Requirements"
of Section 173 does not include all lobbying situations. For example, a wealthy individual could
spend many thousands of dollars on a direct or indirect lobbying campaign and never come
under the registration requirements.
166. An expenditure level of $1,000 is the threshold for political committees' disclosure law.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 46, § 9.1 (1975).
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staff, and agency officials. A good working relationship with such per-
sons can be critical to legislation and to agency decisions.
The disclosed expenditures should be broken down into meaningful
categories; such as advertising and publications, compensation, and*
those expenditures made to personally benefit a public official. To
avoid undue paper work, expenditures below a certain level could be
aggregated rather than reported in detail. An alternative might be a
two-tiered disclosure structure. For example, those who expend be-
tween one thousand and five thousand dollars would be requred to
disclose general information. Those who spend more than five
thousand would report in detail.
Finally, a clear delineation of responsibilities for administering and
enforcing the Act must be drawn. Ideally, an independent commis-
sion, appointed by the Governor and subject to the advice and con-
sent of the Senate, would have responsibilities similar to the Public
Disclosure Commission of Washington State 167 or the Fair Political
Practices Commission and the Franchise Tax Board of California. 168 A
commission was originally proposed by H.B. 1820 but deleted in a
compromise effort in House committee. House Bill 1871 gives the
Secretary of State broader responsibilities including rule-making au-
thority. An independent enforcement agency, with a citizen com-
plaint procedure, is probably one of the most difficult reforms to
achieve in Illinois. At the very least, there should be more clarity in
this area.
Opponents of these lobbying reforms use several arguments. 169
They argue that detailed reporting would require significant new ac-
counting costs that would hurt small and medium-sized organizations;
that the disclosure reports will arrive after public policy issues have
been resolved; that no disclosure will be made of bribery or other
means of influence, such as referral of clients to a public official's law
practice or the giving of campaign contributions through members of
an organization; and that this legislation will create a "chilling effect"
on the First Amendment rights of petitioners.
Under the Attorney General's recent opinion, a significant increase
in reporting detail is now a fact. Just as before the opinion, however,
the reporting requirements increase according to the amounts ex-
pended by the interest groups. Those groups with the funds to lobby
167. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 42.17.370 (West Supp. 1977).
168. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 83100, 9000 (West 1976).
169. See generally 10 I1. Pol. Rep., If You (Don't) Lobby, Read This (Nov. 1977). On file
with the author, COMMON CAUSE-ILLINOIS.
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extensively are also the groups which have the capacity and resources
for complete reporting. The two-tiered requirement of registration
and disclosure suggested above offers a solution to possible burden-
some reportings. Many groups are already maintaining such detailed
records to comply with tax laws. 1 70
It is true that the legislature may have decided an issue before the
disclosure reports are due, but most significant legislation needs sev-
eral sessions to generate enough support to pass. The disclosure re-
ports would be filed, in most cases, before the Governor takes action
either to sign or veto.
Although registration and disclosure does provide a valuable tool
for investigating possible criminal activity, lobby legislation should
not be considered the only tool to reveal improper influence in gov-
ernment. 171  Campaign finance disclosure is an important means to
measure influence, as is pejsonal financial disclosure. Illinois has stat-
utes providing public access to records of interest group members'
contributions to a campaign 172 and the personal finances of a public
official. 173
CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF LOBBYIST REGULATION
Functionally, a "chilling effect" on petitioning has been hard to dis-
cover. 174  Both federal and state courts, however, have held that the
freedom of speech, association and petition are not absolute. When
justified by a compelling governmental interest, incidental infringe-
170. Those entities and individuals who are taxpayers may deduct direct lobbying expendi-
tures but not indirect lobbying expenditures. Records must be kept. See 26 U.S.C. § 112(e)
(1970).
. Non-taxpaying, tax deductible. organizations also need to keep records of expenditures so that
they do not expend more than they are permitted to retain their tax deductible status. See
I.R.C. § 501(c) 3.
171. The Washington State Supreme Court stated that State's Initiative 276-lobby disclosure,
campaign finance disclosure, and personal finance disclosure-are like a mosaic, "designed to
reveal the flow of expenditures incurred in efforts to guide and direct government. The removal
of any one element would conceivably leave a loophole area for exploitation by self-serving
special interests." Fritz v. Gorton, 83 Wash. 2d 275, 310, 517 P.2d 911, 931 (1974).
172. The Illinois campaign finance disclosure act does not, however, require the identification
of a contributor's occupation.
173. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 601-101 (1975); Exec. Order No. 3, Gov. James
Thompson (Aug. 1977).
174. In Washington State, "many observers feel there is no discrimination either in the
number of lobbyists or amount spent." Bone, Washington's Open Government: A Look at Initia-
tive 276, The Nat'l Civ. Rev. (Oct. 1976). This kind of legislation is also extremely popular with




ments upon these rights may be permissible. The United States Su-
preme Court said in Buckley v. Valeo: 175
[C]ompelled disclosure has the potential for substantially in-
fringing the exercise of First Amendment rights. But .. .there are
governmental interests sufficiently important to outweigh the pos-
sibility of infringement, particularly when the free functioning of
our institutions is involved." 176
Additionally, federal courts have had the opportunity to review the
disclosure statutes dealing with money in politics and have found
them to be constitutional. 177  These courts have held that states can
"constitutionally require lobbyists to supply information required by
the statute-an itemized verified statement .. . [of] all items paid,
incurred, or promised in connection with the legislation ...in order
that assemblymen and the public can be made aware of the interests
they represent ...... 178 In denying a motion to dismiss in an action
for violation of the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia stated:
The Section requiring registration does not abridge constitution-
ally guaranteed privileges (freedom of speech, press, assembly and
petition) since it leaves everyone free to exercise those rights cal-
ling upon him only to say for whom he is speaking, who pays him,
how much, and the scope in general of his activity with regard to
legislation. 179
The Illinois Supreme Court has held that "the right of the people
to assemble ... to make known their opinions and to petition for a
redress of their grievances, does not permit them to congregate at
any time or place, or to communicate their viewpoint by whatever
method they choose." 180 The state supreme court upheld, for exam-
ple, the statutory ban on contributions by those who hold liquor
licenses to candidates for public office. The court held that this ban
"does not restrict the constitutional rights of liquor licenses to a
greater degree than is necessary to further the state interests in-
volved." 181
175. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
176. Id. at 60-61. See also Crayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
177. See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); United States v. Harris, 347 U.S. 162
(1959); Burroughs & Cannon v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
178. Moffett v. Killian, 360 F. Supp. 228, 232 (D. Conn. 1973). See also Lewis v. Baxley,
368 F. Supp. 768 (M.D. Ala. 1973).
179. United States v. Slaughter, 89 F. Supp. 205, 206 (D.C. 1950).
180. People v. Barnett, 7 Ill. App. 3d 185, 287 N.E.2d 247 (1972).
181. Schiller Park Colonial Inn, Inc. v. Berz, 63 Ill. 2d 499, 349 N.E.2d 61 (1976).
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While there has been no litigation of the 1969 Illinois Act, other
state courts have upheld the constitutionality of state lobby disclosure
laws. 182  In the Fritz v. Gorton 183 decision, the Washington Su-
preme Court argued that, "[s]ince its ancestral beginnings as an
obscure provision in the Magna Carta, the right to petition has been
commonly understood to be a procedure of an open and public na-
ture."'18 This court also held that by narrowing the scope of the
original initiative to the influence of money upon governmental pro-
cesses, the Washington Act avoided unconstitutional restrictions.1 8 5
California's act has been held unconstitutional by a Los Angeles
County Superior Court, but the decision dealt with specific provisions
of the act rather than broader principles and has since been ap-
pealed. 186
CONCLUSION
Lobby disclosure legislation is "plainly within the area of congres-
sional power and is designed to safeguard a vital national in-
terest." 187 Moreover, disclosure is generally the least restrictive
means of curbing corruption.188 Neither the current Illinois Act, nor
the proposed amendments go beyond the limits prescribed by the
First Amendment to the Federal Constitution nor Article 1, Section
5, of the Illinois Constitution. "Compelled disclosure has the poten-
tial for creating a 'chilling effect' but there are overriding governmen-
tal interests to outweigh this effect." 189
As an active lobbyist, I defend the profession as an honorable one.
It is vital to the functioning of the democratic system. Laws which
regulate do not necessarily destroy a right and it seems clear that the
right of a free people to petition their government must not be al-
182. See Campbell v. Commonwealth, 229 Ky. 264, 17 S.W.2d 227, 228 (1929); Young
Americans for Freedom, Inc. v. Gorton, 83 Wash. 2d 728, 522 P.2d 189 (1974); Fritz v. Gorton,
83 Wash. 2d 275, 517 P.2d 911 (1974).
183. 83 Wash.2d 275, 517 P.2d 911 (1974).
184. Id. at 305.
185. Id. at 306.
186. See Institute of Governmental Advocates v. Younger, Los Angeles, Calif., Super. Ct.,
No. C-110052 (1977). In this case, the Court held the entire Political Reform Title which con-
tains the lobbyist disclosure provisions unconstitutional because it embraces more than one
subject matter. In addition, the prohibition on the making of campaign contributions by lob-
byists and the $10 monthly limit on gifts to officeholders were held to be violations of the equal
protection clause.
187. United States v. Harris, 347 U.S. 612, 626 (1959).
188. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 62 (1976).
189. Id. at 60-61.
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lowed to degenerate into rule by special interests. There is admit-
tedly, at times, a fine line between proper and improper influence in
the decision-making process of government. Good laws, properly in-
terpreted and enforced, are the only hedge against corruption and
improper influence.

